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Abstract 
We analyze the impact of multinational and foreign ownership on the demand for job 
tasks and educational skills. By using Swedish matched employer-employee data, we 
find that both foreign and domestic multinational firms have high shares of non-
routine tasks and tasks requiring personal interaction. Moreover, acquisitions of local 
firms by multinationals increase the relative demand for non-routine and interactive 
job tasks in the targeted firms. The differences in the demand for job tasks are only 
partly explained by firm characteristics. Dividing employees by education instead of 
job tasks does not result in the same effects on relative labor demand, which shows 
that task measures do indeed capture a new labor market aspect. 
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  1I. Introduction 
The influence of multinational enterprises (MNEs) has unsettled policymakers 
worldwide. Some argue that MNEs are more inclined than local firms to offshore jobs 
and downsize inefficient plants – or even shut them down entirely. Indeed, these fears 
are not baseless; MNEs enjoy opportunities to restructure production to capitalize on 
location advantages throughout the world.  
In developed countries - where multinational firms locate knowledge intensive 
production while offshoring low-skilled jobs elsewhere – unskilled workers are 
generally believed to be threatened. Yet studies on foreign direct investment (FDI) 
find small if any effects of outward investments on home country demand for white- 
and blue-collar workers (Slaughter, 2007; Head and Ries, 2002). On a related issue, 
acquisitions of local firms by foreign multinationals have little impact on the relative 
demand for different employees (e.g. Almeida, 2003; and Huttunen, 2007).  
The lack of empirical support may stem from previous studies’ focus on the 
demand for low- and high-skilled labor, often defined in terms of education. Recent 
literature emphasizes that international trade increasingly entails exchanges of bits of 
value added by different job tasks in different locations, rather than finished or even 
intermediate goods (e.g. Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001; Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2008a and 2008b). Several authors put forward that whether job tasks are 
located away from headquarters and main production facilities depends on 
characteristics other than skill intensity (e.g. Markusen, 2006; Blinder, 2006).  
In particular, routine tasks and tasks that do not require personal interaction 
can more easily be offshored. MNEs may thus relocate skill-intensive tasks if they fall 
within this category. On the other hand, some tasks carried out by low-skilled workers 
require proximity to other parts of the production and are not easily offshored. 
  2Shifting the focus from skills to job tasks may allow us to discover unknown effects 
of increased inward FDI on domestic employment.  
We revisit the question how inward FDI and multinational ownership affect 
relative labor demand. In line with recent literature, we define the division of labor in 
terms of job tasks. The underlying assumption is simple: we expect multinational 
firms with global production networks to have a better “offshoring technology” and 
lower offshoring costs than non-multinational firms. Inward FDI, or acquisitions of 
non-multinationals by multinationals, could then trigger a restructuring leading a more 
efficient division of labor and changes in the demand for workers as the global 
production networks of the acquirers become available for the acquired non-
multinational firms. More specifically, we would expect to see decreasing demand for 
workers engaged in activities and job tasks that can be more easily offshored from the 
non-multinational target firms.    
We use comprehensive Swedish matched employer-employee data for the 
period 1996 to 2005. The data include all Swedish firms with at least 20 employees 
and we have detailed information on occupations for a representative sample of 
roughly 50 percent of the labor force.  
We contribute to the literature in several respects. First, we show that MNEs - 
both Swedish and foreign-owned - have a higher share of employees doing non-
routine tasks or tasks requiring personal interaction than local firms. We proceed to 
analyze the effect of different types of acquisitions on relative demand for job tasks, 
and address causality issues by using a propensity score matching method. Our results 
show that acquisitions of local firms by multinational firms increase the share of 
employees doing non-routine tasks or tasks requiring personal interaction. Firm 
characteristics such as offshoring and size explain part of the differences in relative 
  3demand for job tasks. Using a distinction of the labor force according to educational 
attainment – the standard measure in previous studies – does not indicate any effects 
of acquisitions on the skill composition of firms. This suggests that using job task 
measures instead of educational skill measures do indeed capture a new labor market 
aspect.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss 
the background to this paper and related empirical literature, section III describes the 
empirical approach, section IV presents the data and show descriptive statistics, V 
presents the results and VI concludes the paper. 
 
 
II. Background and Related Empirical Literature 
The multinational firm is believed to be a key actor in international division of job 
tasks (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008b). Falling transport costs, improvements 
in information and communication technologies, and liberalized FDI regimes have 
decreased offshoring costs and enabled firms to form increasingly sophisticated global 
production networks. Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) and Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008a; 2008b) note that current trade increasingly entails the exchange of 
small parts of products and processes that involve different job tasks in different 
locations, rather than finished goods or even complete intermediate goods. As a result, 
a very high share of international trade today takes place within MNEs. For instance, 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2007, p.67) show that about 47 percent of US imports 
are conducted within multinational firms in 2005.  
With their international production networks and experience of running 
operations in different countries, MNEs are apt to react and adjust their operations to 
differences in production costs across countries. Multinational firms should therefore 
  4have more specialized production and job tasks as compared to local firms. The 
decision to keep job tasks close to headquarters rests on cost considerations but also 
the possibility to offshore them.  
Several authors argue that characteristics other than skill intensity (level of 
education) explain the ability to offshore job tasks, i.e. locate them away from 
headquarters and main production facilities. For instance, it has been argued that 
offshorable tasks can be summarized in deductive rules (Levy and Murmane, 2004); 
that they are defined by codifiable rather than tacit information (Leamer and Storper, 
2001); and that physical contact or proximity are not required (Blinder, 2006). Such 
job tasks are often carried out by unskilled labor, but this is not requisite. Computer 
programming and x-ray analysis are well-known examples of job tasks that require 
education at post-secondary level, but that can be easily offshored nonetheless.  Many 
Indian radiologists and computer engineers who perform job tasks for US and 
European firms witness to this effect. On the other hand, maintenance and cleaning 
work exemplify job tasks that rely on unskilled labor that cannot be carried out from a 
distance. 
Autor et al. (2003) develop a framework to study how the use of computers 
has affected relative demand for job tasks. They classify job tasks into five different 
categories: non-routine analytical, routine cognitive, non-routine interactive, routine 
manual, and non-routine manual. Routine tasks can be expressed as rules, making 
them easy to program and thus suitable for execution by computers or robots. Yet 
non-routine tasks cannot be easily codified and performed by computers. Autor et al. 
show that shares of non-routine analytical and non-routine interactive tasks in the US 
increased from 1960 to 1998.  
  5This paper focuses on acquisitions’ effect on relative demand for different 
tasks. Theories of ownership change emphasize that a takeover is often seen as an 
opportunity to restructure the operations of the target firm (Shleifer and Summers, 
1988; and Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) and an effective way of reducing of 
administrative and managerial employment (see e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; and 
Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990).  When the acquirer is a multinational firm, the 
takeover may also trigger the offshoring of parts of production to benefit from 
international production networks and reduce costs. 
Studies on foreign acquisitions and relative demand for different skill groups 
are scarce and results are ambiguous. Lipsey and Sjöholm (2008) examine how 
foreign acquisitions of Indonesian firms affect employment of white- and blue-collar 
workers; they find that foreign takeovers increase the number of blue-collar workers 
and have no or even a negative effect on white-collar workers. Slaughter (2000) and 
Head and Ries (2002) discover small if any effects of outward FDI on home country 
demand for blue- and white-collar workers.  
Two other studies use education as a measure of skill instead. Almeida (2007) 
finds that foreign acquisitions of Portuguese establishments do not affect the 
educational composition of workers, whereas Huttunen (2007) documents a marginal 
decrease in share of workers with higher education after foreign acquisitions of 
Finnish establishments. These results suggest that effects of acquisitions on relative 
labor demand are either small or insignificant when defining skills by education. 
Becker et al. (2008) is the only study that defines the composition of labor 
force in terms of job tasks. They use a panel of 490 German MNEs from 1998-2002 to 
examine how foreign employment affects demand for job tasks in the home country. 
  6They find that the proportion of home country non-routine and interactive tasks 
increases with employment in foreign affiliates, especially in the service sector. 
 
III. Econometric Approach 
In line with previous studies on relative labor demand, we estimate the following 
reduced-form translog cost function: 
 
it t j jt i i jt jt jt jt ijt d d w w owner Z Y k ε α α α α α α ψ + + + + + + + + = − ) / log( ) ( ) log( ) log( 5 4 3 2 1 0    (1) 
 
where ψ ijt is the wage cost share of task i in firm j at time t, kjt is the capital-output 
ratio,  Yjt is output, Zjt a variable capturing factor-biased technical change and 
jt i) − i w w / (
                                                
 is the average wage of employees carrying out task i in firm j relative to 
the average wage of other employees.
 1  
Our measure on the cost share for a particular type of job tasks is constructed 
by multiplying the wages in different occupations with the share of the job tasks in 
that occupation and then aggregate the wage cost shares for task i to the firm level.  
We also use the traditional measure of skills defined as costs shares based on 
employees’ level of education, which allows us to compare our results to previous 
studies and to conclude whether the use of job tasks contribute to our understanding 
of FDI and relative labor demand.
2 
We use real value added for Yjt and Zjt
 is proxied by a sector level measure on 
ICT capital defined as capital compensation for computing and communications 
 
1 This is a standard model in related literature (see e.g. Slaughter, 2000; Head and Ries, 2002; Hansson, 
2005; and Becker et al., 2007). Note that the relative wage term in equation (1) may give rise to a 
potential endogeneity bias because wages and employment are jointly determined and because wages 
also enter the dependent variable. We follow the praxis of previous studies and omit this variable. 
2 See Table A1 in the appendix for construction of the variables. 
  7equipment as a share in total capital compensation.
3 The sign of α1 shows if capital 
substitutes for or complements task i, and the sign of α3 depends on whether technical 
change is biased towards or away from the usage of labor carrying out task i. dj, dt, 
and ε it are firm-specific time invariant effects, time-specific effects and an i.i.d. error 
term, respectively. To allow for within firm correlation over time, standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the firm level.   
Owner equals one if a firm is foreign-owned, and zero otherwise, or when we 
compare multinationals to non-multinationals firms, it equals one if the firm is a 
multinational. When we examine ownership changes, Owner takes the value of one 
when an ownership change is recorded and thereafter. 
In the first estimations, we examine the relative demand for job tasks in 
domestic versus multinational (foreign) firms in a sample of firms that remain in the 
same ownership over the entire period. Firms changing ownership are excluded.
4 We 
divide our sample into three groups: foreign-owned MNEs; domestically-owned 
MNEs; and domestically-owned non-MNEs (which we also refer to as local firms). A 
firm is classified as foreign-owned MNE if more than 50 percent of the equity is 
foreign-owned.
5 We define a domestically-owned MNE as a firm reporting positive 
exports to other firms within the corporation. Finally, firms reporting no such exports 
are classified as domestically-owned non-MNEs.
6  
In the second approach, we analyze the effect of an ownership change. All 
firms except those that experience multiple ownership changes are included in the 
                                                 
3 We also use R&D to sales as a proxy for SBTC as a robustness check. 
4 In these regressions we include industry-specific effects but no firm-specific effects. 
5 Statistics Sweden uses the internationally common 50 percent cut-off in defining foreign ownership. 
Other studies on FDI do typically not find lower cut-off values to matter for the results (see e.g. 
Huttunen, 2007; Martins, 2004; and Barbosa and Louri, 2002). 
6 Information on export is available for firms with at least 50 employees and for smaller firms with 
large sales. A few small multinationals might be classified as local firms because of missing 
information on exports. We therefore re-run our estimations below on firms with above 50 employees, 
which does not affect the results. 
  8estimations. We include firm-specific effects, and also time dummies to control for 
changes in the relative task demand that are common to all firms. Three different 
types of acquisitions are examined: from a Swedish local to a MNE, from a Swedish 
local to a foreign MNE, and from a Swedish MNE to a foreign MNE.
7 The first two 
allow us to distinguish between effects of foreign ownership and multinational 
ownership in general. The last allows us to examine if there is an effect on labor 
demand even in acquired firms that are already multinational. Foreign firms acquire 
an average of 49 firms annually: 30 MNEs and 19 local firms. 
The estimated effect of acquisitions may suffer from a potential endogeneity 
problem if the target firms differ systematically from non-acquired firms. We use 
propensity score matching to control for this endogeneity (see e.g. Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983). This approach reduces the bias from differences in firm characteristics 
by comparing the outcomes for similar treated and non-treated observations, based on 
the pre-treatment characteristics. The matching is based on observable firm 
characteristics and uses the algorithms provided by Becker and Ichino (2002) and 
Leuven and Sianesi (2003). We use the Nearest-Neighbor without replacement 
method.  
More specifically, we first calculate the probability that a firm is acquired for 
each of our three different changes in ownership. Each treated (acquired) firm is then 
matched with a non-treated (non-acquired) firm that is as similar as possible. We test 
and make sure that the matching satisfies the balancing property of the propensity 
                                                 
7 The data on Swedish local firms acquired by a MNE consist of firms that are either local during the 
entire period or being acquired by a MNE at some time during the period. The same structure applies to 
the other two forms of takeovers. 
  9score.
8  We proceed to estimate the impact of different types of acquisitions on the 
relative demand for job tasks on the matched sample of firms.  
As discussed in Section II, a potential determinant to relative demand for job 
tasks is the ability to engage in offshoring. We analyze the role of offshoring by 
adding a firm-level proxy of offshoring, defined as the share of imported intermediate 
goods in total sales.
9 This measure proxies offshoring to the extent as increases in the 
share of imported intermediate goods are substituting domestic production. We 
differentiate between offshoring activities to low- and high-income countries. 
Offshoring to high-income countries (OECD countries) is roughly ten times higher 
than offshoring to low-income countries (non-OECD countries). In addition to 
offshoring, we examine if other firm characteristics, such as size, human capital, 
profits, firm age and export intensity can explain firm-level differences in the demand 
for job tasks.  
Finally, we estimate alternative specifications to further examine the 
robustness of our results. Most importantly, we will use alternative definitions of job 
tasks and alternative dependent variables. A description of the included variables is 





                                                 
8  The test for balancing property examines treated and non-treated observations in different sub-
samples (blocks) of observations. The number of blocks is determined by data and the estimated score. 
Within these intervals, the algorithm tests that the means of the covariates in the probit do not differ 
between treated and non-treated observations. In testing the balancing property, only observations in 
the region of common support are included. 
9 This is a common way to measure offshoring in related literature (see e.g. Ekholm and Hakkala, 
2005). As a robustness check, we also make use of a broader measure of offshoring which includes also 
imports of consumption goods.  
  10IV. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Swedish Employer-Employee Data 
 
We use register-based matched employer-employee data set from Statistics 
Sweden covering the period 1996-2005. To ensure that our sample remains consistent 
over time, we restrict our analysis to firms with at least 20 employees. The financial 
statistics contain detailed firm-level information on all Swedish firms. Variables such 
as value added, capital stock (book value), number of employees, wages, ownership 
status, sales, and industry are included. Moreover, regional labor market statistics 
contribute information on education and demographics at the plant level, which we 
aggregate to the firm level. The individual wage statistics database contains 
information on the full-time equivalent wages, education, job types, and gender of 
approximately 2 million individuals per year, roughly 50 percent of the Swedish labor 
force.  
Data on offshoring comes from Swedish Foreign Trade Statistics, collected by 
Statistics Sweden and available at the firm level and by country of origin for the 
period 1997-2005. Stemming from compulsory registration in Swedish Customs, data 
on imports from outside the EU consist of all trade transactions. Trade data for EU 
countries are available for all firms with a yearly import above 1.5 million SEK. 
According to figures from Statistics Sweden, the data incorporates 97 percent of total 
trade with EU countries; however, the number of observations is smaller when the 
offshoring variable is included.
10  
All data sets are linked together with unique identification numbers. The total 
number of observations on firms that do not change ownership equals 28,646. The 
corresponding figures for our three different acquisition samples are 17,832 for 
                                                 
10 To take this into account, we also re-estimate our regressions on firms that are included in the trade 
statistics (around 60% of all firm-year observations). 
  11Swedish local firms to MNEs, 2,287 Swedish MNEs to foreign owned, and 17,086 
Swedish local firms to foreign owned.   
 
Measures of Job Tasks 
In line with Autor et al. (2003) and Spitz-Oener (2006), we classify 
occupations according to the intensity of routine and non-routine tasks. In addition, 
we classify occupations according to the intensity of tasks that require interaction 
between individuals. The classification of occupations derives from information from 
a German work survey codified by Becker et al. (2007); it can be translated to the 
international standard classification of occupations (ISCO-88), available in our data 
on individuals.
11 
In order to classify job tasks into non-routine and interactive, Becker et al. 
(2007) codify the survey answers to 81 yes/no questions that ask whether a worker 
uses a specific workplace tool or not.
12 They distinguish non-routine tasks involving 
non-repetitive methods from routine tasks, and interactive tasks requiring personal 
interaction with co-workers or third parties from non-interactive tasks.
13 Non-routine 
job tasks typically involve a lack of deductive rules and codifiable information, 
whereas interactive job tasks involve physical contact and geographic proximity. The 
measure is constructed as a share of the number of non-routine (or interactive) job 
                                                 
11  The measures are based on the Qualification and Career Survey for 1998/99 conducted by the 
German Federal Institute for Vocational Training (Bundesinstitut for Berufsbindung BIBB) and the 
Research Institute of the German Federal Labor Agency (Institut for Arbetsmarkt- und Berufsforschung 
IAB). See Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) and Spitz-Oener (2006) for two other studies using the same 
work survey. 
12 The workplace tools range from repair tools to machinery and diagnostic devices to computers and 
means of transport. 
13 To assess the robustness they create two measures, one based on a more restrictive interpretation of 
what is non-routine and interactive and another with a more liberal interpretation. For more details 
about the survey and the construction of measures, see Becker et al. (2007). 
  12tasks in the total number job tasks of an occupation and normalized to an index that 
takes values between 0 and 100.
14 
  Table 1 presents the shares of non-routine and interactive job tasks in different 
occupations at the 2-digit level of ISCO-88. There is an overlap—albeit imperfect—in 
the measures of non-routine tasks and tasks requiring personal interaction. The share 
of non-routine tasks is highest in science-based occupations and lowest in occupations 
in services, agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing, and transport. 
Interactive tasks are highly represented in science-based occupations as well, but also 
in education. The share of interactive tasks is low for occupations with a low share of 
non-routine tasks but also in  machine operating, handicraft, and some sales oriented 
occupations, among others.  
 
--Table 1 about here-- 
 
Figure 1 documents the development of employment in Sweden through 
shares of non-routine tasks; tasks requiring personal interaction; and the share of the 
workforce with higher education, measured as with post-secondary education. The 
amount of non-routine and interactive tasks have remained remarkably stable over the 
period 1996-2005: about 42 percent of job tasks are non-routine, and 33 percent 
require personal interaction. Workers with higher education have, however, increased 
substantially from about 12 to 19 percent, in part because of the retirement of old 
workers with generally low levels of education and the entrance of younger, more 
educated cohorts of employees. 
 
                                                 
14   The task measures are normalised by the following formula: x_normi=[xi-min(xi)]/[max(xi)-
min(xi)]*100 where xi is the original task index for occupation i. 
  13   --Figure  1  about  here-- 
 
    --Table  2  about  here-- 
 
Table 2 shows the composition of job tasks and offshoring in firms with 
different ownership.
15 Standard deviations are large which means that the differences 
between ownership are not statistically significant. Bearing this in mind, multinational 
firms—both Swedish and foreign-owned—have higher shares of non-routine tasks 
and tasks that require personal interaction than Swedish local firms. In terms of non-
routine tasks, the differences are rather large, about seven percentage points (0.48-
0.41). The differences between shares of interactive tasks and of higher education are 
smaller than the difference in non-routine tasks. Finally, the difference between 
Swedish and foreign MNEs is very small for all different measures, suggesting that 
the relevant distinction occurs between multinational and non-multinational firms 
rather than between domestic and foreign firms.  
The use of imported intermediate inputs offers one possible explanation for the 
differences in job tasks between firms. Table 2 supports this reasoning—multinational 
firms use imported intermediate inputs more often than local firms, and foreign 






                                                 
15  Job tasks and education are expressed as wage cost shares to make figures consistent with the 
econometric analysis. Using employment shares yields very similar differences but the levels are 
typically about 2 percentage points lower. 
  14V. Results 
Examining a possible link between ownership and job tasks  
Composed of a sample of firms that retain the same owner during the sample period, 
Table 3 examines education and job tasks in foreign versus domestic firms and in 
multinational versus non-multinational firms. Our first estimation shows that foreign 
firms have on average about 3.7 percentage points more non-routine tasks than 
domestic firms, even after controlling for industry and time effects. Differences in 
firm characteristics can partly explain the high share of non-routine tasks; the 
inclusion of firm characteristics in column two reduces the foreign dummy variable, 
but the difference is still 2.4 percentage points and thus statistically significant.  
The group of comparisons in columns one to six includes domestic local firms 
and domestic MNEs. Estimations in columns seven to twelve distinguish instead 
between local firms and domestic and foreign MNEs. A difference in the task 
composition between different firms arises again: multinational firms have between 
2.6 and 4.3 percentage points more non-routine tasks compared to local firms. 
Figure 1 and Table 1 showed that non-routine tasks constitute about 44 percent 
of total tasks. In this case, that non-routine tasks in foreign firms and in MNEs 
constitute a 2.4 - 4.3 percentage points higher share is relatively small but not 
negligible. 
Estimations in columns three, four, nine, and ten use our second measure, the 
share of tasks requiring personal interaction. Foreign firms have more job tasks 
requiring personal interaction than domestic firms, and multinational firms have more 
than local firms. Firm differences in the share of tasks requiring personal interaction 
are smaller than those for non-routine tasks.  
 
  15    --Table  3  about  here-- 
 
  Finally, we compare our results for job tasks with a measure on education as 
dependent variable. As seen in columns five, six, eleven, and twelve, foreign and 
multinational firms have a higher share of employees with tertiary education in some 
but not all estimations. Hence, there is a correlation between higher education and 
non-routine/interactive job tasks, although the size of the coefficients indicates that 
measures of non-routine tasks identify larger differences between firms than the 
traditional measure on education. 
 
Examining the effect of ownership changes on job tasks  
Does an ownership switch from domestic to foreign or from domestic local to 
multinational affect the relative demand for tasks? As discussed in Section II, the 
change from domestic to multinational may affect the demand for tasks because of 
increased specialization, restructuring, and offshoring. We would then expect the 
relative demand for tasks that are not easily offshored—non-routine tasks and tasks 
requiring personal interaction—to increase after acquisition. We would also expect to 
see small changes, if any, in the demand for tasks after foreign acquisitions of 
domestic MNEs, since ownership is only being switched from one type of MNE to 
another.  
The results in Table 4 show that when ownership changes from local Swedish 
to MNE (domestic or foreign), the demand for non-routine tasks increases. The 
magnitude is rather small; demand for non-routine tasks increases about 1 percentage 
point (see column one). A switch from local to foreign ownership or from domestic 
MNE to foreign ownership has no effect. The results for tasks requiring personal 
  16interaction and education are all statistically insignificant with respect to ownership 
changes.  
 
    --Table  4  about  here-- 
--Table 5 about here-- 
 
As discussed in Section III, the estimations in Table 4 suffer from a potential selection 
bias. In Table 5 we report the estimations on a propensity score matched sample of 
firms.
16 The results differ from the estimations in Table 4. A change in ownership 
from local to MNE increases the demand for non-routine tasks by 0.7 percentage 
points and for interactive tasks by 1.3 percentage points. The change from domestic 
local to foreign multinational has almost as large of an effect. As expected, the 
ownership change from domestic multinational to foreign multinational does not 
change the relative demand for tasks. 
An important question becomes thus: does dividing labor according to job 
tasks contribute anything new to our understanding about the effects of FDI on labor 
demand? To examine this issue, we follow in line with the previous literature and 
define our dependent variable in terms of educational attainment. Results show that 
none of the ownership changes has a significant effect on the demand for education, 
as seen in columns seven to nine. This result suggests that changes in the relative 
demand for job tasks do indeed indicate a labor market aspect that an educational 
distinction fails to capture.
17  
 
                                                 
16 Table A2 in the Appendix shows that the bias in the control variables is substantially reduced, 
although a statistical significant difference remains for some of the variables.   
 
17 Other measures on education also showed insignificant difference between different firms. 
  17Trying to explain the differences in job tasks  
The results above suggest that multinational firms have higher shares of non-routine 
tasks and that acquisitions of local firms by MNEs increase the demand for non-
routine tasks and tasks requiring personal interaction. As discussed in Section II, the 
ability to engage in offshoring potentially explains this relative demand. To examine 
the hypothesis further, we include proxies of offshoring, defined as the share of 
imported intermediate goods in total sales. We also distinguish between offshoring to 




-- Table 6 about here-- 
 
Table 6 compares firms with different ownership. Columns 1-5 show 
differences between domestic and foreign firms and columns 6-10 compare domestic 
and multinational firms. As seen in columns one and six, the proxy of offshoring is 
related to job task composition. We would expect offshoring to increase rather than 
decrease the demand for non-routine tasks if offshoring is driven by lower labor costs. 
It is perhaps surprising then that the coefficient of the offshoring variable is negative, 
indicating that a higher share of imported intermediates in output implies a lower 
share of non-routine tasks. A one percentage point increase in offshoring reduces non-
routine tasks by about 0.4 percentage points.  
A closer look at the offshoring measure provides us with an explanation: most 
offshoring is to other high-income countries. We therefore divide our estimations 
between high- and low-income countries. The results in columns two and seven show 
                                                 
18 High-income countries are OECD countries and low-income countries are non-OECD countries. 
  18that offshoring to high-income countries reduces the demand for non-routine tasks, 
whereas offshoring to low-income countries has no statistically significant effect. 
Hence, imports of intermediate goods from other high-income countries appear to 
substitute for more advanced job tasks. 
Even after controlling for offshoring, foreign firms have a higher share of non-
routine tasks than domestic firms, and MNEs a higher share than non-MNEs. The 
estimated effects are smaller than indicated by Table 3, but only marginally so. This 
indicates that the effect of offshoring is similar across ownership groups, which is 
confirmed by the statistically insignificant interaction variables between foreign or 
multinational ownership and offshoring (columns three and eight).  
Another plausible explanation for the results is that ownership is associated 
with firm size and that firm size impacts the demand for tasks. Large firms might, for 
instance, have a different production and labor force structure, and thereby a different 
demand for tasks. We therefore include a conventional variable of firm size, measured 
as the number of employees. Other firm characteristics that affect labor demand may 
exist that are not controlled for in the previous estimations. In additional estimations, 
we include a whole set of firm characteristics, including firm size, share of employees 
with lower secondary education, share of employees with tertiary education, firm age, 
sales per employee, profits per employee, share of women, share of blue-collar 
workers, and share of exports in sales.  
As seen in Table 6, results do not change qualitatively: foreign firms and 
MNEs have a higher share of non-routine tasks after controlling for firm size and 
other characteristics. Note that large firms have less non-routine tasks, which may be 
explained by economies of scale in overhead functions.  
  19In columns one, five, and nine in Table 7, we investigate the impact of 
offshoring in acquisition estimations. The offshoring variable is not statistically 
significant but the estimated coefficient for the acquisition variable changes. The 
ownership switch from local to multinational still increases the demand for non-
routine job tasks, but at a reduced rate. The ownership change from domestic to 
foreign does not increase the demand for non-routine tasks when offshoring is 
included. The change is caused by a different (reduced) sample of firms rather than by 
the inclusion of offshoring; when we repeat the estimations for the reduced sample 
without the offshoring variable, the coefficients of ownership variables are identical to 
the ones in columns one, five, and nine (not shown). We conclude thus that 
differences in offshoring between different firms cannot explain the effects of 
acquisitions on job tasks.  
 
-- Table 7 about here-- 
 
Using our measure of tasks requiring personal interaction as a dependent 
variable generates the same results as in Tables 6 and 7: offshoring has a negative 
effect on the share of interactive tasks, but no major impact on the coefficients for 
foreign and multinational ownership (not shown). 
The results for acquisitions in Table 7 are in line with our previous findings 
when we include firm size, but the effect is slightly reduced when we include other 
firm characteristics. We have also included additional firm-level variables in 
estimations where the cost share of tasks requiring personal interaction is the 
dependent variable. Coefficients on all acquisitions were positive and statistically 
significant when firm size was included (not shown). We conclude that firm size and 
  20other firm characteristics have an effect on task composition but that a difference 
between ownership types still remains, even after controlling for these characteristics. 
When speaking of firm size, we have estimated our regressions on firms with 
at least 20 employees. To take into account that individuals in smaller firms are 
sampled, we only examine the effect of ownership and tasks in large firms. The 
results based on firms with at least 50 employees remained very similar to results of 
the total sample of firms (not shown). 
Finally, we show in columns four, eight, and twelve in Table 7 how the effect 
of acquisitions on job tasks evolves over time. The effect of an ownership change 
from Swedish local firm to multinational is rather immediate, occurring during the 
same year as the acquisition or within the next year. This result suggests that possible 
adjustment costs involved do not prolong the change in the composition of job tasks, 
and that the acquisitions trigger MNEs to institute organizational changes that can be 
quickly realized.  
 
Additional estimations 
We have seen that multinational firms have a higher relative demand for non-routine 
and interactive job tasks than non-multinational firms. The higher demand can be 
reflected in wage cost shares both as a larger number of employees and as higher 
wages. Previous literature has argued that the more rigid the labor market, the more 
likely that an increased relative labor demand would appear in employment shares 
rather than wages (e.g., Machin and Van Reenen, 1998; Anderton and Brenton, 1999; 
Strauss-Kahn, 2003; Hijzen et al. 2005). To gain further insights, we run regressions 
using employment shares instead of labor cost shares as a dependent variable (Table 
  218). The estimated effect shows the impact of ownership on factor demand net of wage 
effects. 
 
--Table 8 about here-- 
 
As seen in columns 1 and 2, foreign and multinational firms still have higher 
shares of non-routine job tasks. The coefficients are marginally smaller than in Table 
3, suggesting that higher wages in MNEs explain part of the difference. More 
interestingly, columns 3 to 5 show that changes in ownership do not affect 
employment shares of routine and non-routine tasks. Hence, the results suggest that an 
important part of changes in relative labor demand are reflected in wages. Heyman et 
al. (2006 and 2007) find that acquisitions increase wages and also wage dispersion, 
primarily by increasing wages for CEOs and other managers.
19 These occupations are 
typically characterized by non-routine and interactive job tasks; therefore, these 
studies seem to correspond to our findings on changes in relative labor demand. 
But are our results also valid for alternative measures of job tasks? To examine 
this issue, we first use a more conservative dependent variable in which fewer tasks 
are regarded as non-routine and interactive (Becker et al., 2007). The results remained 
largely unchanged when we used non-routine tasks as dependent variable, although 
the estimated coefficients declined marginally. For instance, the coefficient for 
foreign ownership declined from 2.4 (Table 3) to 2.1, and the coefficient for MNE 
ownership from 2.6 to 2.3. 
The results for personal interaction changed: the coefficients were not 
statistically significant in the estimations comparing foreign and domestic firms and 
                                                 
19 See also Girma and Görg (2007) and Huttunen (2007) for other studies on acquisitions and wages. 
  22multinational and local firms (not shown). The coefficients for MNE and foreign 
ownership in the acquisition estimations remained statistically significant, but at a 
lower significance level.  
Second, we use definitions of job tasks based on Spitz-Oener’s (2006) study of 
technological change, job tasks, and rising educational demand. Spitz-Oener’s 
definitions stem from the same German survey as we use for our main tasks measures, 
although she uses a different classification of job tasks.
20 In columns 6 to 10 in Table 
8, we present results for estimations using a measure of non-routine tasks based on 
Spitz-Oener’s definitions. Foreign and multinational firms have more non-routine job 
tasks, but shares are lower than for our main measure of non-routine job tasks. 
Similarly, ownership changes from domestic to foreign or multinational have a 
positive but relatively small effect on non-routine job tasks as seen in columns eight 
and nine. As expected, ownership switches from domestic MNEs to foreign MNEs 
have no effect on demand for non-routine tasks. To sum up, our main results are 
robust when considering alternative definitions of job tasks, though the size of the 
ownership effect differs slightly. 
Finally, we have tried alternative specifications of the set of independent 
variables. Unlike our study, most previous studies do not include a variable for 
technology. Our variable on ICT is a sector level variable and therefore implicitly 
assumes that technologies are similar across firms and within sectors. Dropping our 
variable on ICT intensity did not impact the results. Moreover, we also used firm-
level R&D expenditures as an alternative technology variable, but, again, it had no 
major impact on the results.
21 Following previous studies, we excluded the relative 
wage from the main estimations because of the obvious risk of an endogeneity 
                                                 
20 We thank Alexandra Spitz-Oener for sharing her definitions with us. 
21 R&D is not available for all firms below 50 employees and is not available for the years 2003-2005 
which is why it is not included in the default specification.  
  23problem. Including the relative wage increases the coefficients on the ownership 
variables slightly but has no qualitative effect on the results (not shown). The relative 
wage variable is negative, as expected. 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
FDI has increased rapidly over the last decades. Many assume that this development 
will decrease demand for unskilled employees and increase demand for skilled 
employees in developed countries. However, empirical studies find small effects of 
FDI on relative labor demand. Indeed, the distinction between high- and low-skilled 
employees may not be the most relevant.  
In line with recent literature on offshoring and international trade, we examine 
the effect of inward FDI on the demand for labor and define the division of labor in 
terms of job tasks. We begin by examining the differences in job task composition 
between foreign and local Swedish firms and between multinational and local 
Swedish firms. We proceed with the effect of ownership changes, from local to MNEs 
and from domestic, local or multinational, to foreign.  
Multinational firms, both foreign and domestic, have higher shares of non-
routine tasks and tasks requiring personal interaction than local firms. For instance, 
the share of non-routine tasks is between 2.6 and 4.3 percentage points higher in 
MNEs than in local Swedish firms, compared to the aggregate share of non-routine 
tasks of about 44 percent in the Swedish industry. Acquisitions of local firms by both 
foreign and domestic MNEs tend to increase the relative demand for non-routine and 
interactive job tasks. The effect of an acquisition is rather immediate: the largest 
change mainly occurs during the same year as the acquisition or within the next year. 
  24As expected from the theory on multinational firms, acquisitions of Swedish MNEs 
by foreign MNEs have no effect on labor demand.  
Although the difference in job tasks declines when we control for various firm 
characteristics such as offshoring, it does not disappear. Future research can thus try 
to explain the difference in demand for tasks. 
In line with previous studies, we define our dependent variable in terms of 
educational attainment. We find classifying labor force according to educational skills 
does not capture the effects found by using job tasks measures. 
To sum up, FDI in a developed country such as Sweden decreases relative 
demand for routine and non-interactive job tasks—those that do not require proximity 
to other production activities and can be easily offshored. By shifting focus from the 
comparative advantages measured in terms of skills to the content of job tasks, we 
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  29Figure 1. The shares of non-routine tasks, interactive tasks, and 



















Table 2. Ownership, offshoring and job tasks. 
 
Share in total 
number of 
firms 
Share of imported 
intermediates in 
output 












































Note: Higher education is employees with tertiary education. Non-routine tasks, personal interaction, and higher  
education are all defined as cost (wage) shares. Standard deviations are shown within brackets. 
  30Table 3. The effect of ownership on the demand for job tasks and educational skills. Firm-level estimates 1996-2005. 
  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12 
  Foreign Firms 
  
Multinational Firms 






































































































































































































































































Notes: The dependent variable is the wage cost share of the educational skill, non-routine tasks or interactive tasks of employees. Robust standard errors, adjusted for 
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Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the wage cost share for employees with non-routine tasks, in columns 4-6 the wage  
cost share for employees with interactive tasks and in columns 7-9 is the wage cost share for employees with tertiary education.  
Acquisition takes the value of one in the acquisition period and thereafter, zero before. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the  
firm level within parentheses.   *** indicate significance at the 1 %-level, ** significance at the 5 %-level and * significance at the 10 %-level. 
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Table 5. The effect of ownership changes on the demand for non-routine and interactive job tasks.  
















































































































































































































































































Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the wage cost share for employees with non-routine tasks, in columns 4-6 the wage  
cost share for employees with interactive tasks and in columns 7-9 is the wage cost share for employees with tertiary education.  
Acquisition takes the value of one in the acquisition period and thereafter, zero before. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the  
firm level within parentheses.   *** indicate significance at the 1 %-level, ** significance at the 5 %-level and * significance at the 10 %-level. 
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Table 6. The effect of ownership on the demand for non-routine job tasks controlling for additional firm characteristics 1996-2005. 
  1  2  3  4  5 6 7 8 9  10 
























































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: The dependent variable is the wage cost share for employees with non-routine tasks. Offshoring is a firm-level variable defined as the share of imported  
intermediate goods in total sales. High income countries are OECD countries. Low income countries are non-OECD countries. Firm controls are log  
capital intensity, log value added and ICT.  Additional firm characteristics include log firm size, share of high-skilled employees, share of low-skilled  
employees, firm age, sales per employee, profits per employee, share of women, share of blue-collar workers and export per sales. Robust standard errors,  
adjusted for clustering at the firm level within parentheses.*** indicate significance at the 1 %-level, ** significance at the 5 %-level and * significance at the 10 %-level. 
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Table 7.  The effect of ownership changes on the demand for non-routine job tasks controlling for additional firm characteristics. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: The dependent variable is the wage cost share for employees with non-routine tasks. Acquisition takes the value of one in the acquisition period and thereafter, zero 
before. Acquisition t=0 takes the value one in the acquisition period acquisition and zero otherwise. The other Acquisition ((t+1) and (t+2)) variables are defined accordingly. 
Offshoring is a firm-level variable defined as the share of imported intermediate goods in total sales. Firm controls are the same as in Tables 4 and 5. Additional firm 
characteristics include log firm size, share of high-skilled employees, share of low-skilled employees, firm age, sales per employee, profits per employee, share of women, 
share of blue-collar workers and export per sales. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the firm level within parentheses.  *** indicate significance at the 1 %-
level, ** significance at the 5 %-level and * significance at the 10 %-level. 
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 Table 8. The effect of ownership changes on the demand for non-routine job tasks. Alternative dependent variables. 
























































































































































































































































Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the share of employees with non-routine job tasks. The dependent variable in columns 6-10 is the wage cost share for 
employees with non-routine tasks according to Spitz-Oener’s definitions. Acquisition takes the value of one in the acquisition period and thereafter, zero before. The 
acquisition estimations in columns 3-5 and 8-10 are based on the propensity score matched sample. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the firm level within 
parentheses.  *** indicate significance at the 1 %-level, ** significance at the 5 %-level and * significance at the 10 %-level. 
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Table A1. Definitions and descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations). Firms with at least 20 
employees,  1996-2005.  




         
Wage cost share, non-
routine tasks 
Wage cost share, for non-routine tasks   0.44 
(0.20) 






Wage cost share, 
personal interaction 








Wage cost share, 
tertiary education 










Capital/sales  (Net property, plant and equipment)/ sales.  0.00042 
(.0023) 
0.0005 













ICT  Capital compensation for computing and 
communications equipment as a share of total 



















Share of imported intermediate goods in total sales 











Share of imported intermediate goods in total sales 









         
Note: All monetary variables are in 1995 SEK. The task shares are constructed as a share of non-routine (or interactive) job tasks  
in the total job tasks of an employee with a certain occupation. The firm-level wages cost shares are the sum of the task  
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Table A2. Control variables in matched and unmatched samples of firms. 
 Variable  Sample  Mean  % bias  % reduction in 
bias 
t-statistics 




Capital/sales  Unmatched  -9.414 -8.915 -29.6    5.43*** 
  Matched  -9.414 -9.194 -13.1  55.9  1.92* 
Value  added  Unmatched  11.168 10.525 49.5    9.73*** 
  Matched  11.168 10.589 44.6  9.9  6.06*** 
R&D  sales  Unmatched  0.005 0.010 -4.8    0.69 




Capital/sales  Unmatched  -9.462 -8.920 -31.6    4.63*** 
  Matched  -9.462 -9.234 -13.3  58.0  1.54 
Value  added  Unmatched  11.244 10.518 54.7    8.65*** 
  Matched  11.244 10.763 36.2  33.8  3.51*** 
R&D  sales  Unmatched  0.005 0.009 -5.2    0.58 




Capital/sales  Unmatched  -9.146 -9.009 -10.1    1.22 
  Matched  -9.154 -9.161 0.5  94.6  0.04 
Value  added  Unmatched  11.744 12.412 -47.3    5.26*** 
  Matched  11.744 12.297 -39.2  17.2  3.27*** 
R&D  sales  Unmatched  0.036 0.028 7.1    1.03 
  Matched  0.028 0.027 0.9  86.7  0.09 
Note: *** indicate significance at the 1 %-level, ** significance at the 5 %-level and * significance at the 10 %-level. The matching variables are chosen to satisfy the 
balancing property of the propensity score and therefore differ between the three sub-samples. 1) The lag variables used for the matching are value added per employee with 
one and two lags, firm age, export share, (export share)
2, R&D intensity, (R&D intensity)
 2, capital/sales, share of tertiary educated and mean level of labor market experience 
at the firm level. 2) The variables used for the matching are value added per employee with one, two and three lags , firm age, capital/sales, share of employees with upper 
secondary education, R&D intensity and mean level of labor market experience at the firm level. 3) The variables used for the matching are value added per employee with 
one and two lags, firm age, export share, (export share)
2, R&D intensity,  capital/sales, (capital/sales)
 2, share of tertiary educated and labor market experience at the firm 
level. 